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Crossed Swords book. If anyone has this book in Pdf form, would you please share this book with me on this email address [email protected]?. Crossed - Ebook download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read book online. "This is by far the fullest and most authoritative analysis yet published of Pakistan and its army and intelligence services."--New York Review of Books. "Timely.

Crossed Swords Book Pdf

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Book Review. A.H Amin. Crossed Swords is the latest addition to the list of books dealing with. Pakistan Army. Written with an eye on the Western audience by a. PDF | Pakistan Army analysed - Crossed Swords-Book Review ISBN ISBN X. Book Reviews. Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords (Oxford University. Press, Karachi , ) by Amna Mahmood. Price: Rs. /- PP. Democracy and military.

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The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower. Customers who viewed this item also viewed. Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within. Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War. Christine Fair. The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan. Aqil Shah. In Their Own Words: Understanding Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. Review "This is by far the fullest and most authoritative analysis yet published of Pakistan and its army and intelligence services.

Read more. Product details Paperback: Oxford University Press; 1 edition October 11, Language: English ISBN Tell the Publisher! I'd like to read this book on Kindle Don't have a Kindle? Share your thoughts with other customers. Write a customer review.

Read reviews that mention pakistani army pakistani army nawaz understanding essential events political provides relations state subject comprehensive detail important modern researched role. Top Reviews Most recent Top Reviews. There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later. Hardcover Verified Purchase.

Had diner with Shuja before I had a chance to read the book He is fascinating. Paperback Verified Purchase.

Authoritative and easy to read, this book offers great insight into South Asian issues and their relations with world affairs. Compared to the book store An excellent anthology on Pakistan's Army since the birth of the nation. A must-read for anyone studying Pakistan and its Army. A bit dry for those of us who crave for excitement in a book, but it seems to be factually accurate and a book that is worth citing. This book presets an excellent review of the role of the Pakistan Army in pakistani society from it's creation sixty years ago to the present.

This is a very long and well researched treatment of the history of the Pakistani army. The author is tied by family to the elite in the country and provides a view into events that few could match.

Its almost six hundred pages long and there is nothing else really like it. The book covers the entire history of the Pakistani military since the s. In other words, this isn't a great introductory book to the subject nor should everything in it be taken as the only point of view on events. The most difficult thing about understanding Pakistani is understanding that the various groups in the country military, landowners, business all see things from their own perspective and never see the big picture.

The book is good at showing all the different permutations that Pakistani government has taken on and is really wise in terms of explaining why military governments fail in the long run. The book makes a good case as to why a two-leader configuration never works and shows the superiority of the "triumvirate" in Pakistan's case, the President, the Prime Minister and the Army Chief.

The triumvirate seemed to work well in Pakistan but its flaw was that the structure would fail when it came time to replace one of the members. The Prime Minster was a political selection and reflected the political will of the country to an extent. But replacing the president or army chief would inevitably increase the power of the prime minister.

Its not the one pure way to look at events in , but it explains the motivations of some of the players very well. Its also comprehensive in terms of looking at the relationship between Pakistan and the US government over the decades from the Pakistani point of view.

It illustrates the complexity of the relationship and how the US has tended to depend on Pakistan during times of crisis and then abandon it after.

The most interesting bits concern why the US shifted away from Afghanistan and Pakistan in the s. The books contention, somewhat, is that the shift was due to pro-India instincts of the Clinton Administration.

The Clinton Administration re-organized the state department so that Pakistan and India would be dealt with by the same administrative unit.

The book also suggests that the relationship was able to recover somewhat due to Bill Clinton's personal fascination with Benizir Bhutto. A general theme of the book is the failure of the Pakistani Army at the higher command level.

Coordinated attacks at the brigade or division level tended to break down over communications problems. Pakistan was unlucky in having a man like Iskandar Mirza at the Ministry of Defence.

Mirza did not advise Mr Jinnah correctly and the fact that he had hardly served in the Army and did not understand military affairs further ensured that Mr Jinnah and the Prime Minister remained as ignorant as they were about military affairs as they were when they were in high school. It is incorrect to criticise Liaqat for Operation Venus since in December the Indian position was much more secure than in Liaqat can be criticised for not ever visiting Kashmir while the war was on and for not standing by Mr Jinnah in pressurising Gracey in October to order the Army to attack Kashmir.

The Indians were lucky in having comparatively more regular army officers who led from the front and is evident from higher officer casualties among Indian Army officers above the rank of captain vis a vis the Pakistan Army. The treatment of is also very superficial. His use of the term British for the pre period is also factually incorrect as India till was ruled by the English East India Company using mostly its private Bengal Army ,Madras Army,Bombay Army , its private European regiments and some regiments on rent from British Army to conquer ventire India.

In discussion of Martial Races Theory the author totally ignores the fact that Punjab Loyalty in to the British was one of the main reasons why martial races theory was evolved. This is a simple point noted even by British writers like Philip Mason.

The author also fails to note the politically important fact that the English East India Company's army was the knight in shining armour which saved the Muslims of Punjab and settled areas of present Pashtun NWFP from the Sikhs who were using Muslim Mosques as stables gunpowder magazines and plastering their walls with cowdung. The author talks about martial races theory and thinks that martial races theory was all about Punjab and Frontier as it is now but perhaps does not know that one of martial races theory's most famous exponent Major General Macmunn regarded the Khanzada Rajputs of Firozpur Jhirka as the finest fighting race in India.

The author also fails to note that the Sikhs were in majority in the fighting arms till First World War and were reduced to a minority by being replaced with Punjabi Muslims after First World War because the Punjabi Muslims were regarded as phenomenally loyal , even against Muslims by the British. Thus the author conveniently ignores two important developments of WW One i.

What are the 'Must Read' books about Pakistan?

In discussion of Ayub Khan the author totally ignores allegations about Ayub's tacfical timidity in Burma. This incident was discussed by three writers of the time. In an article Brigadier Nur Hussain a reliable authority did state that Ayub Khan was close to General Gracey because they drank together.

The authors discussion of old officers is also partial. On page 33 he states that " Akbar Khan who gained notoriety in Kashmir Akbar Khan was the pioneer of Kashmir war but Shuja thinks that he was notorious. A strange assertion. Mr Jinnah's historic decision of creating two infantry battalions of Bengalis is also not all discussed by the author. It may be noted that Ayub Khan refused to expand the East Bengal Regiment till as a result of which the Bengalis were further alienated for not being given the due share in the armed forces.

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The authors analysis of origin of officer corps is also superficial. The author does note the fact that Pakistani SSG captured Indian War Plan on Samba Kathua road before the war actually started but fails to note the fact that it was Pakistan's Military Intelligence led by Director Military Intelligence Brigadier Irshad who refused to give any serious thought to this discovery and dismissed it as an Indian ruse.

The most serious distortion of history committed by Mr Shuja Nawaz is on page when he gives the credit of 25 Cavalry's action of 8th September at Gadgor to Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik.

The authority he quotes is Farouk Adam , then a very junior officer and not in 24 Brigade Headquarter.

It must be clarified that a good military historian or analyst's prime motivation in all writing has been to endeavour to write "what men did" rather than what "they ought ideally to have done" or what "someone later with the benefit of hindsight tried to portray , what they had done". Thus the analysis of Chawinda Battle done with pure loyalty to service without any inter arm rivalry or nationalistic motivation. Pure and unadulterated military history filtered dispassionately separating fact from fiction and myth from reality.

Crossed Swords

History as Frederick the Great once said can be well written only in a free country and ours has been continuously under civil or military dictators since I maintain as one great master of English prose said that "all history so far as it is not supported by contemporary evidence is romance"! Battle of Chawinda was thus not romance!

What many in this country wrote and was outwardly military history was essentially "Romance"! Inspiring, superhuman but a myth promiscuously mixed with reality!

Chance plays a key role in battle and at Chawinda chance played a very important role! Nisar, when he deployed 25 Cavalry did not know what was in front of him! This mutual ignorance saved Pakistan on that crucial day! Later heroes were created! I repeat "Heroes were created"!

The hero had to be from the Salt Range however! At least Shuja Nawaz wants it this way! What were the key facts? Most important tangible fact was "casualties"! These were deliberately hidden since these would have let the cat out of the bag! Everyone would have discovered who really fought and who got gallantry awards on parochial,regimental or old boy links!

How many were killed in the biggest military blunder "Operation Gibraltar"! This is Top Secret! How many infantry men died at Chawinda?

Again no mention of any figures! The real motivation here is not national interest but to preserve or more important to "guard reputations" Now lets talk about the broad front deployment that Shuja Nawaz refers to. There is no doubt that the "broad front deployment" was done by Nisar and Nisar alone and Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik had no role in it.

It is another matter that Nisar also did not know what was in front of him. It was like Jutland when both contending fleets were running towards each other at express train speed. Why Nisar behaved as he did and what actually happened even today is hard to understand, whatever anyone may claim now with the benefit of hindsight!

Shuja Nawaz here in his page book offers no tangible proof that the actions of 25 Cavalry had anything to do with what Brig A. A Malik told Nisar. Nisar was told to "do something" as clearly stated by an authority no less than Pakistan Army's official historian Major General Shaukat Riza,apparently not from Jhelum or from North of Chenab by a twist of fate.

There is no doubt that Nisar did something without the least clue of what was in front of him. The important thing is that Nisar did something rather than getting paralysed into inertia and inaction! The "Do Something" order by Brig A. A Malik to Lt Col Nisar CO 25 Cavalry should not have been glorified to something higher by Shuja Nawaz simply on authority of an article written by a person who was a company 2IC in an infantry battalion of 24 Brigade and that too only in This is a serious historical failing.

At least in a military historian but is the Oxford University Press Pakistan run by professionals. One may ask Colonel M. Y Effendi. The same words of Brig A. Perhaps Shuja Nawaz did not read all the accounts of direct participants.

Perfectly excusable as he is based in USA. But not good military history certainly. The fact is that the 25 Cavalry on 8th September was functioning in a vacuum.

Brig A. A Malik had no clue about armour warfare and Nisar had no higher armour headquarter to guide him.. The crucial action took place at Gadgor few miles north of Chawinda in which 25 Cavalry faced the entire Indian 1st Armoured Division.

This was an extraordinary situation and Nisar acted on his own best judgement since Malik had abdicated to Nisar by stating that he should do something. It is another thing that Nisar also did not know what was in front of him and acted boldly and unconventionally. Had he known what was in front of him he may have been paralysed by inertia and inaction! But this is speculation and some part of history always remains unfathomed and hidden!

Nisar acted through sheer reflex and deployed his unit in an impromptu manner. The fire fight which took place at Gadgor between hours and hours was a pure tank versus tank affair.A must read to understand the past and the ongoing events. There is a difference of perception on historical events or facts. Developed differences with Prime Minister Sharif over the governments one-sided policies against terrorists and violence in Sindh and over the prime ministers attempts to intrude into military promotions and other matters.

At that time the Indian Army was well established in Kashmir and well poised to meet any threat. She survived an attack on her first procession on arrival in Karachi on 19 October but died following another attack on her outside Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi on 27 December The proximity of its vast and often hostile neighbour, India, and the difficulties in establishing a representative democracy in a country so divided by region and ethnicity, meant that the Pakistan Army came to see itself as the bastion of national survival.

The most serious distortion of history committed by Mr Shuja Nawaz is on page when he gives the credit of 25 Cavalry's action of 8th September at Gadgor to Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik.

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