Education Heidegger Introduction To Metaphysics Pdf


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MARTIN HEIDEGGER. Introduction to Metaphysics. New translation by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. NB YALE NOTA BENE. Yale University Press New. Page iii. Introduction to Metaphysics Martin Heidegger New translation by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. Page iv. Originally published as Einführung in die. of Hazrat Mawlana Jalaluddin Rumi's work, regardless of who they are and Immersing oneself in the ocean of love and co.

Heidegger Introduction To Metaphysics Pdf

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Since its publication in , Introduction to Metaphysics has been one of Martin. Heidegger's most widely read works, second perhaps only to Being and Time. In this translation I do not hope to solve Heidegger's ambiguities or explain them For Heidegger, an introduction such as his "Introduction into Metaphysics". Heidegger, Martin. Introduction to Metaphysics. Translated by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. New Haven: Yale University Press, First published in

Click on an option below to access. Log out of ReadCube. Volume 1 , Issue 2. Please check your email for instructions on resetting your password. If you do not receive an email within 10 minutes, your email address may not be registered, and you may need to create a new Wiley Online Library account.

If the address matches an existing account you will receive an email with instructions to retrieve your username. First published: April Tools Request permission Export citation Add to favorites Track citation. Share Give access Share full text access. Share full text access. Please review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article. Heidegger spent a period of reputedly brilliant teaching at the University of Marburg — , but then returned to Freiburg to take up the chair vacated by Husserl on his retirement.

Out of such influences, explorations, and critical engagements, Heidegger's magnum opus, Being and Time Sein und Zeit was born. Published in , Being and Time is standardly hailed as one of the most significant texts in the canon of what has come to be called contemporary European or Continental Philosophy.

Moreover, Being and Time, and indeed Heidegger's philosophy in general, has been presented and engaged with by thinkers such as Dreyfus e. A cross-section of broadly analytic reactions to Heidegger positive and negative may be found alongside other responses in Murray Being and Time is discussed in section 2 of this article.

In Heidegger joined the Nazi Party and was elected Rector of Freiburg University, where, depending on whose account one believes, he either enthusiastically implemented the Nazi policy of bringing university education into line with Hitler's nauseating political programme Pattison or he allowed that policy to be officially implemented while conducting a partially underground campaign of resistance to some of its details, especially its anti-Semitism see Heidegger's own account in Only a God can Save Us.

During the short period of his rectorship—he resigned in —Heidegger gave a number of public speeches including his inaugural rectoral address; see below in which Nazi images plus occasional declarations of support for Hitler are integrated with the philosophical language of Being and Time. After Heidegger became increasingly distanced from Nazi politics. Although he didn't leave the Nazi party, he did attract some unwelcome attention from its enthusiasts.

After the war, however, a university denazification committee at Freiburg investigated Heidegger and banned him from teaching, a right which he did not get back until One year later he was made professor Emeritus.

Against this background of contrary information, one will search in vain through Heidegger's later writings for the sort of total and unambiguous repudiation of National Socialism that one might hope to find. The philosophical character of Heidegger's involvement with Nazism is discussed later in this article.

Exactly when this occurs is a matter of debate, although it is probably safe to say that it is in progress by and largely established by the early s. If dating the turn has its problems, saying exactly what it involves is altogether more challenging.

Indeed, Heidegger himself characterized it not as a turn in his own thinking or at least in his thinking alone but as a turn in Being. The core elements of the turn are indicated in what is now considered by many commentators to be Heidegger's second greatest work, Contributions to Philosophy From Enowning , Beitrage zur Philosophie Vom Ereignis.

This uncompromising text was written in —7, but was not published in German until and not in English translation until Section 3 of this article will attempt to navigate the main currents of the turn, and thus of Heidegger's later philosophy, in the light of this increasingly discussed text. Heidegger died in Freiburg on May 26, He was buried in Messkirch. According to this latter gloss, the linguistic constructions concerned—which involve hyphenations, unusual prefixes and uncommon suffixes—reveal the hidden meanings and resonances of ordinary talk.

In any case, for many readers, the initially strange and difficult language of Being and Time is fully vindicated by the realization that Heidegger is struggling to say things for which our conventional terms and linguistic constructions are ultimately inadequate. Viewed from the perspective of Heidegger's own intentions, the work is incomplete. It was meant to have two parts, each of which was supposed to be divided into three divisions.

What we have published under the title of Being and Time are the first two divisions of the intended part one. The reasons for this incompleteness will be explored later in this article. One might reasonably depict the earliest period of Heidegger's philosophical work, in Freiburg —23 and Marburg —6 , before he commenced the writing of Being and Time itself, as the pre-history of that seminal text although for an alternative analysis that stresses not only a back-and-forth movement in Heidegger's earliest thought between theology and philosophy, but also the continuity between that earliest thought and the later philosophy, see van Buren , Viewed in relation to Being and Time, the central philosophical theme in these early years is Heidegger's complex critical relationship with Husserl's transcendental phenomenology—what Crowell , p.

For the young Heidegger, then, it is already the case that phenomenological analysis starts not with Husserlian intentionality the consciousness of objects , but rather with an interpretation of the pre-theoretical conditions for there to be such intentionality. On Heidegger's interpretation see Sheehan , Aristotle holds that since every meaningful appearance of beings involves an event in which a human being takes a being as—as, say, a ship in which one can sail or as a god that one should respect—what unites all the different modes of Being is that they realize some form of presence present-ness to human beings.

Thus the unity of the different modes of Being is grounded in a capacity for taking-as making-present-to that Aristotle argues is the essence of human existence.

Heidegger's response, in effect, is to suggest that although Aristotle is on the right track, he has misconceived the deep structure of taking-as. For Heidegger, taking-as is grounded not in multiple modes of presence, but rather in a more fundamental temporal unity remember, it's Being and time, more on this later that characterizes Being-in-the-world care. For more on Heidegger's pre-Being-and-Time period, see e.

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For more on the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger, see e. Consider some philosophical problems that will be familiar from introductory metaphysics classes: Does the table that I think I see before me exist? Does God exist? Does mind, conceived as an entity distinct from body, exist? We typically don't even notice this presupposition. This is one way of asking what Heidegger calls the question of the meaning of Being, and Being and Time is an investigation into that question.

The question of the meaning of Being is concerned with what it is that makes beings intelligible as beings, and whatever that factor Being is, it is seemingly not itself simply another being among beings. But to think of Being in this way would be to commit the very mistake that the capitalization is supposed to help us avoid. For while Being is always the Being of some entity, Being is not itself some kind of higher-order being waiting to be discovered.

As long as we remain alert to this worry, we can follow the otherwise helpful path of capitalization. Heidegger means by this that the history of Western thought has failed to heed the ontological difference, and so has articulated Being precisely as a kind of ultimate being, as evidenced by a series of namings of Being, for example as idea, energeia, substance, monad or will to power.

In this way Being as such has been forgotten. So Heidegger sets himself the task of recovering the question of the meaning of Being. In this context he draws two distinctions between different kinds of inquiry.

The first, which is just another way of expressing the ontological difference, is between the ontical and the ontological, where the former is concerned with facts about entities and the latter is concerned with the meaning of Being, with how entities are intelligible as entities.

The second distinction between different kinds of inquiry, drawn within the category of the ontological, is between regional ontology and fundamental ontology, where the former is concerned with the ontologies of particular domains, say biology or banking, and the latter is concerned with the a priori, transcendental conditions that make possible particular modes of Being i.

For Heidegger, the ontical presupposes the regional-ontological, which in turn presupposes the fundamental-ontological. As he puts it: The question of Being aims… at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for the possibility of the sciences which examine beings as beings of such and such a type, and, in doing so, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations.

Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task. So how do we carry out fundamental ontology, and thus answer the question of the meaning of Being? It is here that Heidegger introduces the notion of Dasein Da-sein: there-being.

Haugeland , complains that this interpretation clashes unhelpfully with Heidegger's identification of care as the Being of Dasein, given Heidegger's prior stipulation that Being is always the Being of some possible entity. This fits with many of Heidegger's explicit characterizations of Dasein see e. That said, one needs to be careful about precisely what sort of entity we are talking about here.

As Haugeland notes, there is an analogy here, one that Heidegger himself draws, with the way in which we might think of a language existing as an entity, that is, as a communally shared way of speaking. This appeal to the community will assume a distinctive philosophical shape as the argument of Being and Time progresses. The foregoing considerations bring an important question to the fore: what, according to Heidegger, is so special about human beings as such?

Here there are broadly speaking two routes that one might take through the text of Being and Time. The first unfolds as follows.

If we look around at beings in general—from particles to planets, ants to apes—it is human beings alone who are able to encounter the question of what it means to be e. More specifically, it is human beings alone who a operate in their everyday activities with an understanding of Being although, as we shall see, one which is pre-ontological, in that it is implicit and vague and b are able to reflect upon what it means to be.

Mulhall, who tends to pursue this way of characterizing Dasein, develops the idea by explaining that while inanimate objects merely persist through time and while plants and non-human animals have their lives determined entirely by the demands of survival and reproduction, human beings lead their lives Mulhall , This gives us a sense of human freedom, one that will be unpacked more carefully below. This can all sound terribly inward-looking, but that is not Heidegger's intention.

In a way that is about to become clearer, Dasein's projects and possibilities are essentially bound up with the ways in which other entities may become intelligible. So perhaps Mulhall's point that human beings are distinctive in that they lead their lives would be better expressed as the observation that human beings are the nuclei of lives laying themselves out. The second route to an understanding of Dasein, and thus of what is special about human beings as such, emphasizes the link with the taking-as structure highlighted earlier.

Sheehan develops just such a line of exegesis by combining two insights. These dual insights lead to a characterization of Dasein as the having-to-be-open. In other words, Dasein and so human beings as such cannot but be open: it is a necessary characteristic of human beings an a priori structure of our existential constitution, not an exercise of our wills that we operate with the sense-making capacity to take-other-beings-as. And this helps us to grasp the meaning of Heidegger's otherwise opaque claim that Dasein, and indeed only Dasein, exists, where existence is understood via etymological considerations as ek-sistence, that is, as a standing out.

Dasein stands out in two senses, each of which corresponds to one of the two dimensions of our proposed interpretation. Second, Dasein stands out in an openness to and an opening of Being see e.

As we have seen, it is an essential characteristic of Dasein that, in its ordinary ways of engaging with other entities, it operates with a preontological understanding of Being, that is, with a distorted or buried grasp of the a priori conditions that, by underpinning the taking-as structure, make possible particular modes of Being.


Heidegger puts it like this: whenever an ontology takes for its theme entities whose character of Being is other than that of Dasein, it has its own foundation and motivation in Dasein's own ontical structure, in which a pre-ontological understanding of Being is comprised as a definite characteristic… Therefore fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein.

This resistance towards any unpalatable anti-realism is an issue to which we shall return. But what sort of philosophical method is appropriate for the ensuing examination?

Famously, Heidegger's adopted method is a species of phenomenology. In the Heideggerian framework, however, phenomenology is not to be understood as it sometimes is as the study of how things merely appear in experience.

Presupposed by ordinary experience, these structures must in some sense be present with that experience, but they are not simply available to be read off from its surface, hence the need for disciplined and careful phenomenological analysis to reveal them as they are. So far so good. But, in a departure from the established Husserlian position, one that demonstrates the influence of Dilthey, Heidegger claims that phenomenology is not just transcendental, it is hermeneutic for discussion, see e.

In other words, its goal is always to deliver an interpretation of Being, an interpretation that, on the one hand, is guided by certain historically embedded ways of thinking ways of taking-as reflected in Dasein's preontological understanding of Being that the philosopher as Dasein and as interpreter brings to the task, and, on the other hand, is ceaselessly open to revision, enhancement and replacement.

For Heidegger, this hermeneutic structure is not a limitation on understanding, but a precondition of it, and philosophical understanding conceived as fundamental ontology is no exception. Thus Being and Time itself has a spiral structure in which a sequence of reinterpretations produces an ever more illuminating comprehension of Being. As Heidegger puts it later in the text: What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it the right way… In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing.

To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have understood that our first, last and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves.

And this is a tension that, it seems fair to say, is never fully resolved within the pages of Being and Time.


The best we can do is note that, by the end of the text, the transcendental has itself become historically embedded. More on that below. What is also true is that there is something of a divide in certain areas of contemporary Heidegger scholarship over whether one should emphasize the transcendental dimension of Heidegger's phenomenology e. Heidegger argues that we ordinarily encounter entities as what he calls equipment, that is, as being for certain sorts of tasks cooking, writing, hair-care, and so on.

Indeed we achieve our most primordial closest relationship with equipment not by looking at the entity in question, or by some detached intellectual or theoretical study of it, but rather by skillfully manipulating it in a hitch-free manner.

Entities so encountered have their own distinctive kind of Being that Heidegger famously calls readiness-to-hand. Thus: The less we just stare at the hammer-thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is—as equipment. Being and Time 98 Readiness-to-hand has a distinctive phenomenological signature.

While engaged in hitch-free skilled activity, Dasein has no conscious experience of the items of equipment in use as independent objects i.

Thus, while engaged in trouble-free hammering, the skilled carpenter has no conscious recognition of the hammer, the nails, or the work-bench, in the way that one would if one simply stood back and thought about them. Tools-in-use become phenomenologically transparent. Moreover, Heidegger claims, not only are the hammer, nails, and work-bench in this way not part of the engaged carpenter's phenomenal world, neither, in a sense, is the carpenter.

The carpenter becomes absorbed in his activity in such a way that he has no awareness of himself as a subject over and against a world of objects. Crucially, it does not follow from this analysis that Dasein's behaviour in such contexts is automatic, in the sense of there being no awareness present at all, but rather that the awareness that is present what Heidegger calls circumspection is non-subject-object in form. Phenomenologically speaking, then, there are no subjects and no objects; there is only the experience of the ongoing task e.

Heidegger, then, denies that the categories of subject and object characterize our most basic way of encountering entities. He maintains, however, that they apply to a derivative kind of encounter.

When Dasein engages in, for example, the practices of natural science, when sensing takes place purely in the service of reflective or philosophical contemplation, or when philosophers claim to have identified certain context-free metaphysical building blocks of the universe e.

With this phenomenological transformation in the mode of Being of entities comes a corresponding transformation in the mode of Being of Dasein. Dasein becomes a subject, one whose project is to explain and predict the behaviour of an independent, objective universe.

Encounters with the present-at-hand are thus fundamentally subject-object in structure. The final phenomenological category identified during the first phase of the existential analytic is what Heidegger calls un-readiness-to-hand. This mode of Being of entities emerges when skilled practical activity is disturbed by broken or malfunctioning equipment, discovered-to-be-missing equipment, or in-the-way equipment.

When encountered as un-ready-to-hand, entities are no longer phenomenologically transparent. However, they are not yet the fully fledged objects of the present-at-hand, since their broken, malfunctioning, missing or obstructive status is defined relative to a particular equipmental context.

The combination of two key passages illuminates this point: First: [The] presence-at-hand of something that cannot be used is still not devoid of all readiness-to-hand whatsoever; equipment which is present-at-hand in this way is still not just a Thing which occurs somewhere.

The damage to the equipment is still not a mere alteration of a Thing—not a change of properties which just occurs in something present-at-hand. Being and Time And second: When something cannot be used—when, for instance, a tool definitely refuses to work—it can be conspicuous only in and for dealings in which something is manipulated. Being and Time Thus a driver does not encounter a punctured tyre as a lump of rubber of measurable mass; she encounters it as a damaged item of equipment, that is, as the cause of a temporary interruption to her driving activity.

With such disturbances to skilled activity, Dasein emerges as a practical problem solver whose context-embedded actions are directed at restoring smooth skilled activity. Much of the time Dasein's practical problem solving will involve recovery strategies e. In the limit, however e. Secondly, Manheim's felicitous translation of Heidegger at times obscures, by its very fluidity, important philosophical issues; this is because an idiomatic translation may sacrifice terminological consistency or precision in a turn of phrase for the sake of a more natural-sounding English expression.

We have tried to maintain a high degree of consistency in conveying key concepts, retreating from this standard only when sense absolutely dictates otherwise. The point of this procedure is to let readers form their own interpretations of Heidegger's words, based on their knowledge of all the contexts in which they appear.

To some readers this fidelity will result in what sounds at times like an unnatural English, but it is important to recognize that Heidegger's language can be just as alien to a native German speaker. A common objection against so-called literal translations is that a single word can have many meanings, depending on the context.

This is true, and it is especially true of Heidegger. But the best way to suggest the shifting pattern of the meanings of a German word is to use one word in English that is amenable to undergoing a similar series of uses. For example, when we consistently use "fittingness" to translate Fug, we do not mean to imply that the word should always be understood according to some single formula, such as a dictionary definition.

The various meanings of "fittingness" in this text must be gathered from its successive contexts, just as one would understand the senses of Fug if one were reading the German text. If we used several different renderings, it would become impossible to see the connections among the various uses of Fug Page x for there are many such connections, even if no single, formulaic definition of the word is possible. Having said this, we must also acknowledge that it has not always been possible to employ a single English word to render some of Heidegger's terms.

Because Heidegger places such a great emphasis on the importance of language and the use of language for the question of Being and its history, the attentive reader should learn enough about Heidegger's philosophical terminology to form a judgment concerning the best way to render Heidegger's key words in English. Because we have endeavored to maintain a high degree of terminological consistency in our translation, we hope this version of the Introduction to Metaphysics will aid this process of reflection.

To assist the reader further, especially the reader who comes to Heidegger for the first time with this book, we offer here a brief discussion of important words in Heidegger's philosophical vocabulary, restricting ourselves to the most difficult and characteristic terms used by Heidegger in this work.

We also recommend a study of the more comprehensive glossary accompanying this translation. The reader must understand that what follow here are sketches, not definitions, and that only doser study through an engaged process of familiarization can develop the fuller meaning of these words. There are no solutions to genuine problems of translation, only temporarily satisfactory placeholders for what thoughtful readers should themselves take up as a question about language. Das Seiende: beings; what is; that which is.

Heidegger's expressiondas Seiende is broad enough to refer to any entity, physical or otherwise, with which we may have dealings, whether real, illusory, or imagined. One helpful passage in this text IM 58 suggests the range of things that may count as beings, including vehicles, mountains, insects, the Japanese, and Bach's fugues. Das Seiende or the equivalent Seiendes also often refers to beings in general and as a whole, as in the opening question of the book, "Why are there Page xi beings [Seiendes] at all instead of nothing?

Finally, Seiendheit means "beingness," that which characterizes beings as beings, in general. For Heidegger, much of the history of philosophy has focused on this beingness rather than inquiring into the happening of Being itself. Das Sein: Being. For Heidegger, Being is not anything. It is not a being at all.

Introduction to Metaphysics often gives the impression that Being is the same as beingness. However, Heidegger's ultimate question is how it is that beings in their beingness become available to us in the first place, or how we come to understand what it means to be. The question of Being, in this sense, inquires into the happening, the event, in which all beings become accessible and understandable to us as beings.

Being is thus essentially verbal and temporal. Literally translated, das Sein would be "the to be," but this would be far too clumsy a rendering. Among Heidegger scholars there is considerable controversy on how best to translate das Sein into English. Many prefer the lowercase "being" in order to fend off the impression that Heidegger means some Supreme Being standing above or holding up all other beings; das Sein must not be mistaken for a subject deserving the substantiation that capitalization can imply in English.

In German, all nouns are capitalized, so there is no such implication. Still, in our judgment, to render das Sein as "being" risks confusion, especially with "beings" as the translation for das Seiende, and so we resort to the capitalized term. Dasein: A word left untranslated in almost all renderings of Heidegger'swork, Dasein denotes that being for whom Being itself is at issue, for whom Being is in question.

For the most part, in Heideg- Page xii ger, this being is us, the human being, although Dasein is not equivalent to human beings; Heidegger insists that Dasein is not an anthropological, psychological, or biological concept.

We can think of Dasein as a condition into which human beings enter, either individually or collectively, at a historical juncture when Being becomes an issue for them; in this sense, Heidegger often speaks in this text of "historical Dasein" "our Dasein," "human Dasein," or "the Dasein of a people. But Heidegger consistently sees the Latin term existentia as misleading and superficial see IM 49, , so it is preferable to interpret Dasein in terms of its root meaning.

This root meaning is usually rendered in English as "Being there," but when Heidegger hyphenates Da-sein, we have employed the equally valid translation "Being-here. Das Nichts: Nothing. As the first sentence ofIntroduction to Metaphysics indicates, the question of "nothing" will be a recurrent theme of this work. For Heidegger, there is a deep connection between das Nichts and das Sein, and once again, the reader must beware of taking the capitalizedNothing as a substantive thing. Neither Being nor Nothing is a being for Heidegger.

We have resorted to capitalization again to avoid confusion between Heidegger's use of das Nichts, which as Nothing is the counterpart to das Sein, Being, and his use ofNichts or nichts, without the article, which generally means "nothing" as employed in more ordinary language.

Gewalt: violence. Gewalt belongs to a family of words used in this work that present considerable difficulties for translation. In ordi- Page xiii nary German, Gewalt can mean violence in the sense of arbitrary and willful force, but it can also mean the legitimate force employed by the institutions of the state. We have decided to translate this word uniformly as "violence," in part for the sake of consistency, but also because Heidegger seems to want to underline the radically transformative work of the Gewalt-tat and the Gewalt-ttigerthe act of violence and the doer of violencewithout minimizing the danger and even the terror of such work.

Still, the reader should keep in mind the ambiguous meaning of Gewalt in German. Walten; das Walten: hold sway; the sway. Related toGewalt are the words walten a verb and das Walten a verbal noun.

In ordinary German,walten means to prevail, to reign, to govern, to dominate. Heidegger interprets the Greek word phusis, which is usually translated as "nature," as a Greek name for Being itselfthat is, the "emergent-abiding Walten" of beings as such.

We believe the expression "the sway" suggests this powerful upsurge of the presence of beings. That Heidegger seeks to interpret phusi as this "sway" is an undertaking to which the reader must lend special attention. Grund: ground; reason; foundation.

Like its English cognate, "ground," the GermanGrund can mean both the earth beneath our feet and the reason upon which we establish a position. As such, ein Grund can be a foundation, and it is opposed toein Abgrund, an abyss. For Heidegger, every serious "Why? We translate Grund and related words in a variety of ways, as indicated here, because no single English word can adequately capture its range of meaning.

Der Mensch: humanity; human beings; humans; the human being; the human. In German,Mensch means human being, irrespective of gender, and so, with a very few exceptions, we have Page xiv sought to preserve this gender neutrality, especially because Heidegger discusses all human beings as Dasein.

Volk: a people; the people. The German wordVolk has a troubled history. In official Nazi ideology, the Volk is the race, the bearer of a specific historical destiny, both biological and spiritual.

A Companion to Heidegger's "Introduction to Metaphysics"

But in ordinary German, Volk has no necessary connection with race. It can mean a people or a nation, or "the people" as the basis for sovereignty as in the American "We the people" , although Volk usually does not mean "people" in the informal sense of "folks around here. Beyond the question of terminology, as our discussion of das Volk suggests, it is crucial to take into account the historical context of Introduction to Metaphysis.

Manheim's translation at times blunts the edge of the political references and implications of Heidegger's work. When Heidegger delivered the original lecture course in , Adolf Hitler had been in power for two years.

Heidegger had himself joined the National Socialist party in May and served the regime as the rector of the University of Freiburg from April until his resignation in April , when he determined that he had lost an internal power struggle concerning the direction of educational policy. For further discussion, see Richard Wolin, ed. IM , may well escape the contemporary reader: Hamsun, a Nobel Prizewinning writer, was a Nazi sympathizer; Haecker's book advanced a clearly anti-Nazi argument.

Some in Heidegger's German audience of recognized the significance of this Introduction to Metaphysics, although perhaps not in the way Heidegger had expected or hoped. The young Jrgen Habermas, himself recently a student of Heidegger's, wrote a letter to the editors of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, declaring his outrage that Heidegger could publish in , without comment or retraction, his words of hailing the "inner truth and greatness" IM of the National Socialist movement.

The sentence reads in full as follows: "In particular, what is peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of National Socialism, but which has not the least to do with the inner truth and greatness of this movement [namely, the encounter between global technology and modern humanity], is fishing in these footnote continued from previous page Philosophy and Politics Philadelphia: Temple University Press, ; and Gregory Fried, Heidegger's Polemos: From Being to Politics New Haven: Yale University Press, See also Wolin's introduction to the Habermas letter for an overview of the history of the passage in question.

Page xvi troubled waters of 'values' and 'totalities'" Particularly problematic has been the status of the phrase within the brackets. In the edition, this phrase stood in parentheses, indicating by Heidegger's own convention that he had added the phrase in During the controversy that arose around Habermas's demand for an explanation, Christian Lewalter published a letter in Die Zeit arguing that the passage in question means that "the Nazi movement is a symptom for the tragic collision of man and technology, and as such a symptom it has its 'greatness,' because it affects the entirety of the West and threatens to pull it into destruction.

In his prefatory note to Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger claims that material in parentheses was added at the time of the lectures and that material in brackets was added during later reworking of the text; in his interview with 5 On the letters by Lewalter and Heidegger, see Wolin, The Heidegger Controversy, Page xvii Der Spiegel, Heidegger explicitly asserted that the parenthetical remark "was present in my manuscript from the beginning" but that he did not read it aloud for fear of party informers.

In our translation, we have indicated wherever parentheses in the edition have now been revised to brackets to show that the material was added not in but thereafter. The three student assistants who worked on the page proofs of Introduction to Metaphysics upon its publication have all asserted that this insertion was not part of the original text, and furthermore that Heidegger changed the phrase "greatness of N.

More recent German editions of Heidegger's text, including the Gesamtausgabe edition, have revised such passages, changing parentheses to brackets, and we have relied on such corrections in preparing our translation. Page xviii degger mentions, and we have occasionally commented on the contents of these works when we believe that such commentary would enhance the understanding of his lectures. Furthermore, in addition to scholarly and contextual references, where Heidegger's language becomes especially difficult or where the sense depends in part on the German itself, we have provided either interpolations of the German words or, where the language is ambiguous or especially complex, a footnote for entire phrases or sentences.

We have also provided the pagination from the Niemeyer edition in the margins of this translation so that readers may easily find the German whenever they have questions about the translation.

We have used the Greek alphabet in longer citations, on the assumption that any readers who study the details of these longer passages will know Greek and will not need a transliteration.

In footnotes, we have also frequently provided conventional translations of Greek passages, because Heidegger's own interpretative translations often depart from what scholars would generally recognize as a conventional rendering, and the reader should have the opportunity to judge the extent of Heidegger's departure. Aside from all issues of vocabulary, political context, and textual history, Introduction to Metaphysics remains, first and foremost, a powerful and provocative work of philosophy.

Heidegger's impassioned lectures resonate with each other and with us, leaving us with a wealth of questions. What is the meaning of Being? Does it have a particular meaning for Westerners, and if so, how did it come to have that meaning? Does our ordinary disregard for such issues blind us to our history and condemn us to a superficial relation to the world? Do our ordinary science and logic separate us Page xix from the truth?

What is truth in the first place? What is language? What is thinking?

What is it to be human at all? We prefer not to try to answer such questions here, or to venture farther into the difficulties of interpreting Introduction to Metaphysics as a whole. Instead, we hope that our translation will make it possible for thoughtful readers to enter the book on their own and form their own judgments.

Our outline, glossary, and index may provide some assistance. Readers who are interested in further explorations of the many dimensions of this text may also consult the anthology A Companion to Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics, which is being published by Yale University Press as a sequel to this volume.

Those who read German may also consult Heidegger's own notes on the lecture course, as well as an alternate draft of one section, included as an appendix to the Gesamtausgabe edition, In his notes, Heidegger criticizes the lecture course for failing to develop the question of Being in its fullest breadth; the draft treats the topic of the etymology of Being, with some significant differences from the published lectures.

Page numbers refer to the German pagination. The why-question as the first of all questions 16 B. Philosophy as the asking of the why-question 1. The untimeliness of philosophy 2. Two misinterpretations of philosophy a. Philosophy as a foundation for culture b. Philosophy as providing a picture of the world 3. Philosophy as extraordinary questioning about the extraordinary C. Phusis: the fundamental Greek word for beings as such 1.

Phusis as the emerging, abiding sway 2. The later narrowing of the meaning ofphusis Page xxi D. The meaning of "introduction to metaphysics" 1.

Meta-physics as questioning beyond beings as such 2. The difference between the question of beings as such and the question of Being addition, 3. Introduction to metaphysics as leading into the asking of the fundamental question E. Unfolding the Why-question by means of the question of Nothing 1. The seeming superfluity of the phrase "instead of nothing" 2. The connection between the question of Nothing and the question of Being 3.

The superiority of philosophy and poetry over logic and science 4. An example of poetic talk of Nothing: Knut Hamsun 5.

The wavering of beings between Being and the possibility of not-Being F. The prior question: How does it stand with Being? The mysteriousness of Being 2. Nietzsche: Being as a vapor 3. Our destroyed relation to Being and the decline of the West a.

The geopolitical situation of the Germans as the metaphysical people b.

The failure of traditional ontology to explain the emptiness of Being c. Philosophical questioning as essentially historical d. The darkening of the world and the misinterpretation of spirit e.Forgot your password? And it does so not just incidentally, not just because its manner of communication seems strange or even deranged to everyday understanding. Standing and phusis iii. Volume 1 , Issue 2 April Pages Being as presupposed by every identification of a being as such.

The question that does indeed resonate in the interrogative sentence, but nevertheless remains closed off and enveloped there, must first be developed. Therefore this questioning in itself is not some arbitrary process but rather a distinctive occurrence that we call a happening.

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